Abstract This paper examines the role of coalition formation in the empirically observed negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. We study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed people, low-and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy equilibria belonging to the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled workers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit.
Introduction
In most countries, labor markets institutions such as employment protection, unemployment benefits and minimum wage legislations prevent private parties from freely setting prices or quantities, creating rigidities. These rigidities may be at least in part socially efficient in a second-best sense. For instance, in a world where workers could be hired and fired at a hat's drop and at no cost for the employer, workers would have little incentive to acquire firm-specific skills. Employment protection could then provide incentives for workers to increase their productivity. Similarly, unemployment benefits provide insurance for risk-averse workers affected by random employability shocks.
Making the point that some rigidities may be optimal (see Blanchard and Tirole 2007, among others) of course does not mean that the current level of rigidities is the optimal one or that it is determined by a social planner maximizing some measure of welfare. As for the first point, many economists blame rigidities for high (long-term) unemployment, especially in Europe, and have been advocating for a long time making the labor market more flexible (see for instance OECD Jobs Study, 1995) . Despite these recommendations, many governments have failed to successfully implement such plans (see Section 5.1 in Boeri et al. 2011; or Saint-Paul 1996) . Part of the literature has then taken a turn toward political economy explanations of both the emergence of labor market institutions and the resistance against moves toward more flexibility.
The same type of approach has been adopted by several papers studying the political economy of labor market institutions. These papers have in common that they adopt an insider-outsider view of the labor market, pitting currently employed workers against currently unemployed agents, and that they build a unidimensional model that focuses on a single institution, either unemployment benefits (UB thereafter, see Wright 1986; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Pallage and Zimmermann 2001) or the employment protection level (EPL from now on, see Saint-Paul 1999 , 2000 , 2002 . 1 Several papers try to understand the emergence and/or continuation of two types of equilibria, an "American" (or "Anglo-saxon") one with low UB or low EPL and a "continental European" one with large UB or EPL. They differ in the economic model adopted (they build upon the seminal paper by Wright (1986) or rather use some version of a matching or a costly search model), the political economy equilibrium (direct majority voting or the maximization of the utility of some class of agents) and the reason why the "American" and "continental European" equilibria differ. Koeniger and Vindigni (2003) stress the importance of product market regulation and the way it affects the demand for EPL. Both Hassler et al. (2005) and Belot (2007) resort to variations in the
